Political Economy of Argentine Sovereign Debt and the Holdouts Problem
By Vighneswara Swamy Ph.D* vs@iegindia.org There seems to be no end to the sovereign debt woes of Argentina in the near future, as the "holdouts" are accused of turning out to be vultures and are hell bent on their pound of flesh.
The crisis has resurfaced as the Argentine President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, having been advised by her country"s lawyers, to intentionally default on dollars of its sovereign debt in order to force a renegotiation of the debt and to take the case away from American judges. This is the second such default by Argentine in the last thirteen years. Expert analysts term this a bad advice, and Argentina continues to follow it. Even if Argentina nudges ahead to restructure all its sovereign debt outside US to avoid the jurisdiction of the US courts, it might further deepen its status as a pariah country. The debt crisis has indeed compounded the problems for Argentina as it is already imbued with an array of macroeconomic woes caused by the artificially overvalued currency leading to stubbornly high inflation, state subsidies that are sapping resources, and an abysmal business climate that has seen investment all but dry up. If the crisis is not resolved adequately, there is every danger of driving the Argentine economy into structural economic mess. Though, Argentina has had seven defaults since 1827 to 2001 that were mostly selfinflicted, the 2014 default seems to be due to a sudden shift in the international sovereign debt regime fvaouring the "hold-outs" governed by US laws. The puzzle is how did it all happen? How can it be resolved? What is the way forward? What are the lessons to the other developing countries?
The Crisis and the Consequent Default
The Achilles" heel of Argentine economic strategy lies with its approach that has long relied on fiscal largesse as a basic policy tool, covering its shortfalls by expanding the money supply. This resulted in recurring bouts of high inflation and indebtedness, followed up by ephemeral efforts to stabilize prices. En route the end of 20 th century, Argentina experienced hyperinflation and brought in the new regime with the Menem-Cavallo cure for chronic inflation, the now infamous "convertibility plan." Though, at first convertibility plan worked well, cracks in Argentine economic policy began to resurface due to the large fiscal deficits both at the provincial and national levels. Compounded by the practice of rolling over, the sovereign debt began to grow from 1993. The overvalued Argentine Peso soon got overvalued reducing the country"s international competitiveness followed by the typical declines in public revenues to service the mounting debt. A sovereign default implies that the government is no longer willing or capable of paying the debt it has legally incurred in the international markets.
Restructuring Saga
Hit with the financial crisis, Argentina had to suffer capital flight and steep devaluation of currency leading to sudden evaporation of its wealth. As poverty and unemployment 
The Possible Way Out
Some economists argue that Argentina should simply pay the "holdout" creditors and get over with, or at least try to haggle over a rate that works for both parties. But such a move of paying the court-ordered $1.5 billion to plaintiffs could expose Argentina to upward of $15 billion in additional claims from other holdouts, and deplete the country"s $28 billion in foreign reserves to its less than a half, which Argentina most probably cannot afford to. In another interesting development, the private sector has initiated to intervene as the Association of Bankers of Buenos Aires (ADEBA) was actively involved in talks with the holdouts in New
York and was rumored to have offered to buy the debt from the vulture funds in a series of payments. In another development, international banks have approached private investors with a stake in Argentina"s financial stability to buy the disputed debt and allow Argentina to resume servicing its bonds. Besides, Argentina has taken steps towards normalizing the economy and relations with the outside world. Moreover, this 2014 default is more of a technical default not because of the inability; Argentina should not be in a precarious position. At only one third of GDP, Argentina"s sovereign debt is quite sustainable. In the short term, there might not be any severe noticeable impacts on the real economy, but it does not augur well for the long term. IMF needs to take a proactive stance to resolve the situation. As economist Roubini argues, the root cause for defaults lie in the government"s state-centric economic policies and is scaring away investors and consumers alike. According to Roubini, Argentina has moved away from marketoriented policies with imports substitution protectionist measures; national control over natural resources; a more predominant role for state companies and banks and discouraging foreign investments and the influx of capital. He terms this a form of "state capitalism" which makes the country more vulnerable to any domestic or international turmoil.
On a theoretical perspective, typically, an inherent characteristic of global financial markets is that debtors and creditors systemically tend to overshoot, periodically giving rise to unsustainable debt situations that end up in a liquidity crisis or a default in the worst case. inclusive, equitable, and maybe even more effective than all the other approaches but faces significant obstacles regarding its implementation.
Concluding Remarks
Argentina has become almost as infamous for sovereign debt defaults as it is for its failures in the world cup soccer. That apart, the 2014 sovereign default of Argentina poses unsettling questions for policymakers. It is a fact that the country"s periodic debt crises are often the result of self-destructive macroeconomic policies. However, in this case, the default is triggered by a significant shift in the international sovereign debt resolution mechanism;
particularly the shift favors hard line creditors in bond issuances governed by US law. It is unfortunate that there is no steadfast cooperation from the US to IMF in establishing credible debt restructuring mechanism at place to ensure macroeconomic and global financial stability.
Given the global economic scenario where there is slowing of emerging market growth and rising external debt, this trend of new interpretations by the judicial adjudicators make the future rescheduling more difficult and do not abode well for global financial stability. The take away for the developing countries from the Argentine sovereign debt trauma is to greatly deepen their domestic debt markets in the long run. Though domestic borrowing is not a panacea, but, to some extent, it can enable the countries stay away from the vultures in the global markets.
